We study the design of contracts that incentivize experts to collect information and truthfully report it to a decision … on the ex post payoff of the decision maker. The contract thus has to induce the experts to "monitor each other" by …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … laboratory experiment, we show that consumers are generally reluctant to accept expensive treatment recommendations, which is …

between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …

field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the …

as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either … ; experiment …