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Sequential bargaining with public intervention : the optimal subsidy path
Aanesen, Margrethe - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003778311
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Blackmailing lobbyists
Schneider, Maik T. - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907299
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Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergari, Cecilia - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008907400
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Harmonization and side payments in political cooperation
Harstad, Bård - In: The American economic review 97 (2007) 3, pp. 871-889
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003505558
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Playing against an apparent opponent : incentives for care, litigation, and damage caps under self-serving bias
Landeo, Claudia; Nikitin, Maksim I.; Izmalkov, Sergei - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571775
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Playing against an apparent opponent : incentives for care, litigation, and damage caps under self-serving bias
Landeo, Claudia; Nikitin, Maksim I.; Izmalkov, Sergei - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571781
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One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392702
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Law and economics and tort litigation institutions : theory and experiments
Landeo, Claudia - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376701
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To commit or not to commit? : an experimental investigation of pre-commitments in bargaining situations with asymmetric information
Hoffmann, Sönke; Mihm, Benedikt; Weimann, Joachim - In: Journal of public economics 121 (2015), pp. 95-105
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337114
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Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining
Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137
Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119