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Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27

I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526

Rockets and Feathers in the Laboratory

Bayer, Ralph C. - 2011

Consumers often complain that retail prices respond faster to increases in wholesale prices than to decreases. Despite many empirical studies confirming this "Rockets-and-Feathers" phenomenon for different industries, the mechanism driving it is not well understood. In this paper, we show that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120045

Asymmetric Learning from Financial Information

Kuhnen, Camelia M. - 2014

domain. Such asymmetric learning may help explain documented empirical patterns regarding the differential role of poor vs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065977

A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till; Hüning, Hendrik - 2013

This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and …. We find that more efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous treatments and … strength. Simultaneous decisions in endogenous ordering avoid observational learning and compensate the higher degree of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009779323

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 239-247

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game with an informed proposer and an uninformed responder, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about his endowment. A simple message game with heterogenous players with respect to lying costs shows that in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011048127

Is more information always better? Experimental financial markets with asymmetric information

Huber, Jürgen; Sutter, Matthias; Kirchler, Michael - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - 2004

We study the value of information in financial markets by asking whether having more information always leads to higher returns. We address this question in an experiment where single traders have different information levels about an asset's intrinsic value. In our treatments we vary the nature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765185

The value of lies in a power-to-take game with imperfect information

Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2012

Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010543595

The value of lies in an ultimatum game with imperfect information

Besancenot, Damien; Dubart, Delphine; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2012

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game involving informed proposers and uninformed responders, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about their endowment. If there are some intrinsically honest proposers, a simple message game shows that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010545145

Power and the Privilege of Clarity : An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2012

People in inferior bargaining positions are often vaguer when they express their preferences. In this paper, we explain how power shapes clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Our main...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184653