Consumers often complain that retail prices respond faster to increases in wholesale prices than to decreases. Despite many empirical studies confirming this "Rockets-and-Feathers" phenomenon for different industries, the mechanism driving it is not well understood. In this paper, we show that,...

We study whether information about imminent future dividends can abate bubbles in experimental asset markets. Using the seminal design of Smith et al. (1988) we find that markets where traders are asymmetrically informed about future dividends have smaller, and shorter, bubbles than markets with...

Embezzlement is a major concern in various settings. By means of a sequential modified dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement and improve the...

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Prices usually adjust much faster when costs increase than when costs decrease. The mechanism driving this Rockets-and-Feathers phenomenon is not well understood despite of ample empirical evidence for its existence.We use simple experimental markets with and without consumer search and either...

Do individuals anticipate present bias in others? This paper jointly investigates beliefs about one's own and others' present bias. In an online experiment, participants engaged in a real-effort task display little awareness of their own present bias, but anticipate present bias in others....

We report on an experiment on decentralized markets in the presence of adverse selection. When allowing for costless and non-binding communication (cheap-talk), there exists a partially separating equilibrium that results in a substantially higher efficiency level than the adverse selection...

The paper reports results from an Ultimatum Game experiment with asymmetric information where Proposers can send to Responders misleading information about their endowment. We allow for all possible gender combinations in the Proposer-Responder pairs. Proposer messages that underestimate the...

This paper demonstrates the importance of simultaneously considering two behavioral biases, correlation neglect and overprecision, in characterizing belief formation. Our laboratory experiments reveal that, relative to independent signals, subjects overvalue moderately or strongly correlated...