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Timing Decisions in Organizations : Communication and Authority in a Dynamic Environment
Grenadier, Steven R. - 2016
We consider a problem where an uninformed principal makes a timing decision interacting with an informed but biased agent. Because time is irreversible, the direction of the bias crucially affects the agent's ability to credibly communicate information. When the agent favors late...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013005665
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Transparency in Hierarchies
Hofmann, Christian; Indjejikian, Raffi - 2022
We examine how performance management practices that render employee accomplishments transparent in an organization depend on employees’ hierarchical level. We consider a principal-agent model of an organization where the principal contracts directly with a group of higher-level agent-workers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294886
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Collusion between Vertical Hierarchies under Asymmetric Information
Yehezkel, Yaron - 2022
The paper considers an infinitely repeated competition between vertical manufacturer-retailer hierarchies. In every period, retailers privately observe the demand, consequently manufacturers pay retailers “information rents”. I compare between several collusive equilibria that differ in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296860
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How organizational hierarchy affects information production
Skrastins, Janis; Vig, Vikrant - 2015
This paper empirically investigates how organizational hierarchy affects the allocation of credit within a bank. Using … interference { through which hierarchy affects loan outcomes. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010518012
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Information Hierarchies
Brooks, Benjamin - 2020
, we define an information hierarchy as a partially ordered set and ask whether higher elements being Blackwell more … informed always makes the hierarchy compatible with higher elements having more information (under various notions of that term …) than lower elements. We show that the answer is affirmative if and only if the graph of the hierarchy is a forest. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012847880
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Delegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2002
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263055
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Delegation and Information Revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - University of Bonn, Germany - 2002
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a partial contracting set-up, where only the control over actions is contractible. We consider an organization that should take two decisions, affected by a common state of the world parameter only known by the agent. We show that, if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968420
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Delegation and information revelation
Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2000
This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organization where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984983
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The dangers of dispersal of responsibilities
Burlea, Adriana Schiopoiu; Remmé, Joop - In: Amfiteatru economic : an economic and business research … 19 (2017) 45, pp. 464-476
Taking into account that it is in the nature of the modern corporat ion that risks are distributed over several agents, we discuss in this paper the organisational behaviour as it results from such dispersal of responsibilities for both the principal and the agent. We explore the hypothesis that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795459
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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005
In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571