Showing 1 - 10 of 3,046
We study how adverse selection distorts equilibrium investment allocations in a Walrasian credit market with two …-sided heterogeneity. Representative investor and partial equilibrium economies are special cases where investment allocations are … trade and investment allocations below perfect information levels. The degree of heterogeneity between informed agents' type …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181247
A "folk theorem" originating, among others, in the work of Stiglitz maintains that competitive equilibria area always or "generically" inefficient (unless contracts directly specify consumption levels as in Prescott and Townsend, thus bypassing trading in anonymous markets). This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144184
This paper studies competitive market shutdowns due to adverse selection, where sellers post nonexclusive menus of contracts. We first show that the presence of the worst type of agents (moldy lemons) causes markets to fail only if their mass is sufficiently large. We then show that a small mass...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293231
. These firms are forced to cut back on their investment and consumption spending which, in turn, exacerbates the recession …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010692897
In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in such a way that produces in equilibrium very...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012590148
We provide a rationale for bank money creation in our current monetary system by investigating its merits over a system with banks as intermediaries of loanable funds. The latter system could result when CBDCs are introduced. In the loanable funds system, households limit banks' leverage ratios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013187924
Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyze this issue in a principal-agent model, focusing on unemployment levels and labor productivity. In our model, a higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697870
Empirical literature on moral hazard focuses exclusively on the direct impact of asymmetric information on market outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call second-degree moral hazard – the tendency of the supply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010199693
In this paper, we ask under what conditions norms can enhance welfare by mitigating moral hazard in income insurance. We point out a particular role of norms, namely to compensate for insurers' difficulties in monitoring the behavior of insured individuals. Thus, the functioning of social norms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482983
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003114944