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Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk : experts vs. quacks
Smirnov, Aleksei; Starkov, Egor - 2019
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
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Rewarding mediocrity? : optimal regulation of R&D markets with reputation concerns
Chen, Chia-hui; Ishida, Junichiro - 2017
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
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One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining
Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773
A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276
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Asymmetric power and market failure : power hazard in exchange
Ertürk, Korkut A. - 2016
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708
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Information Asymmetry and Incentives for Active Management
Kim, Min S. - 2010
This paper presents a model in which fund managers choose between active management and passive management when investors cannot directly observe managers' efforts and skills. In an equilibrium skilled managers actively manage their funds only when skills can add a large value in active...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135435
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What to put on and that to keep off the table? A politician's choice of which issues to address
Sayag, Rei S.; Swank, Otto H. - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009724339
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Sequential aggregation of verifiable information
Hahn, Volker - 2010 - This version: September 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748176
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Informative cheap talk in elections
Kartik, Navin; Van Weelden, Richard - In: The review of economic studies : RES 86 (2019) 2, pp. 755-784
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012109384
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Will truth out? : an advisor's quest to appear competent
Klein, Nicolas Alexandre; Mylovanov, Tymofiy - In: Journal of mathematical economics 72 (2017), pp. 112-121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011833219
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Why voting? : a welfare analysis ; conference paper
Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas - 2013 - This version: July 2013
Which decision rule should we use to make a binary collective choice? While voting procedures are applied ubiquitously, they are criticized for being inefficient. Using monetary transfers, efficient choices can be made at the cost of a budget imbalance. Is it optimal to do so? And why are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342115