This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

We derive the optimal selling mechanism for a monopolist who is privately informed about the attributes of a horizontally differentiated good. To do so, we set up an informed principal problem in a Hotelling model where the buyer's preferences are described in terms of a base consumption value...

This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is derived. Equilibrium inefficiencies in both...

We investigate optimal rationing of resources and organizational slack when a principal procures from an agent with private information about fixed and variable costs. We study the problem in a two‐period setting with persistent types and investigate how the optimal rationing and slack depend...

We study a duopoly where the two price setting firms have symmetric information. The firms produce substitute goods with a state dependent common value. The information that is available to both firms about the unknown state of nature is also available to the consumers, who also have access to...

This paper examines the phenomenon of management-initiated, court-supervised reorganization of companies in U.S. bankruptcy court. The proposed in-court persuasion mechanism reconciles excessive reorganizations of non-viable companies (and subsequent repeat failures) with management-initiated...

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the...

In this paper, we explain delays in patent licensing, and propose a solution to eliminate the delays. Licensing promotes technology transfer, but some empirical studies point out that delay in a license agreement exists, and this delay then pushes back the release of new products with patented...

This paper investigates a contest in information revelation between firms that seek to persuade consumers by revealing positive own information and negative information about the rival. In the face of limited bandwidth, firms are forced to make a trade-off between disclosing their own positive...