In this article I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may manipulate voting coalitions to their advantage by crafting different messages to target different winning coalitions. Furthermore, if...

We tested the influence of time pressure and to what extent time pressure interacts with the contextual factors ("payoff scheme" and "level of costs for information that can be acquired") in three laboratory experiments. Participants had to decide how many pieces of information they wanted to...

The paper studies the relative merits of direct and representative legislation in a setting where voters are uncertain both with respect to the likely consequences of different policies and with respect to the political preferences of their fellow citizens. Under representative legislation, the...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...

This paper studies implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is not guaranteed to be truthful because of strategic actions. We thus...

The opportunity to tell a white lie (i.e., a lie that benefits another person) generates a moral conflict between two opposite moral dictates, one pushing towards telling always the truth and the other pushing towards helping others. Here we study how people resolve this moral conflict. What...