We study a dynamic model of collateralized lending under adverse selection in which the quality of collateral assets is endogenously determined by hidden effort. Complementarities in incentives lead to non-ergodic dynamics: Asset quality and output grow when asset quality is high, but stagnate...

This article analyzes the work of the late Dr. William Vickrey, the McVickar Professor Emeritus of Columbia University and 1996 Nobel-laureate in Economics. In choosing Vickrey for the Nobel prize, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences notes Vickrey's fundamental contributions to the economic...

We formalize a decentralized market where consumers with privately-known preferences meet bilaterally with firms. The latter acquire information to raise their degree of price discrimination from second to first. In a dynamic setting where outside options are endogenous, information choices are...

For an economy characterized by neo-Keynesian wage rigidity, an optimal open market rule is derived based on financial market information, including auction price behavior. Simulations of a small model of the United States--estimated via full information maximum likelihood together with a...

Monetary models overwhelmingly feature a particular asset, "money", as the medium of exchange in an economy. However, the adoption of a medium of exchange is endogenous and subject to changes if conditions favor a different asset. We study the liquidity role of a real asset that is subject to...

Banks lend more to banks that are similar to them. Using data from the German credit register and proprietary supervisory data on the quality of banks’ loan portfolio, we show that a similar portfolio of the lending and borrowing bank helps to overcome information asymmetries in interbank...

This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in a general equilibrium model of securities markets and banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric...

This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...

We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this...