The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are quasilinear-in-leisure. For this version, it is shown that it is possible...

Optimal nonlinear taxation of income and savings is considered in a two-period model with two individuals who have additively separable preferences and who only differ in their skill levels. When the government can commit to its second period policy, taxes on savings do not form part of the...

Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input into a nonlinear production process. These assumptions imply that wage rates are...

The impacts of changing the number of individuals of a particular skill level on the solutions to two versions of the finite population optimal nonlinear income tax problem are investigated. In one version, preferences are quasilinear in leisure. For this version, it is shown that it is possible...

The problem faced by a taxation authority choosing a tax schedule for families is modeled as a multi-dimensional screening problem. A description of the possible constrained Pareto-efficient mechanisms is given. The implications of a standard redistributive assumption on the sign of marginal tax...