We study how transparency, modeled as information about one's counterparty liquidity needs, affects the functioning of an over-the-counter market. In our model, investors hedge endowment risk by trading bilaterally in a search-and-matching environment. We construct a bargaining procedure that...

In this paper, we document that households' consumption expenditures crucially depend on their expected earnings - even after controlling for realized earnings, wealth and time-invariant unobserved characteristics such as permanent income and over-confidence. To explain this evidence, we develop...

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

In this paper, we document that households’ consumption expenditures depend on their expected earnings - even after controlling for realized earnings and wealth. To explain this evidence, we develop and structurally estimate a standard-incomplete markets model in which rational households...

In this paper, we document that households' consumption expenditures depend on their expected earnings - even after controlling for realized earnings and wealth. To explain this evidence, we develop and structurally estimate a standard-incomplete markets model in which rational households...

In a financial economy with asymmetric information and incomplete markets, we study how agents, having no model of how equilibrium prices are determined, may still refine their information by eliminating sequentially "arbitrage state(s)", namely, the state(s) which would grant the agent an...

In this paper we provide a characterization of the welfare properties of rational expectations equilibria of economies in which, prior to trading, agents have some information over the realization of uncertainity. We study a model with asymmetrically informed agents, treating symmetric...

This paper lays down a model where dispersed information generates booms and busts in economic activity. Boom-and-bust dynamics start when firms are initially over-optimistic about demand due to an aggregate noise shock in their signals. Consequently, they over-produce, which generates a boom....

his study develops a rational expectations equilibrium model of IPO underpricing within which the distribution of underpricing is explicitly modeled, as opposed to assumed. Contrary to assumptions of prior studies, IPO quality is not inferred from IPO underpricing, is explicitly defined, and is...

Given a market with a price process S populated by heterogeneous traders with differential information, beliefs, and trading constraints, let the smallest information set containing all of the traders' information be denoted F. This market is defined to be informationally efficient (Fama [2])...