Similar Search Results

Sequential Contests with Incomplete Information : Theory and Experimental Evidence

Brookins, Philip; Matros, Alexander; Tzachrista, Foteini - 2022

In this paper, we investigate behavior in two-player sequential-move contests with complete and incomplete information about the value of the prize, theoretically and experimentally. First, we describe a Bayesian equilibrium of a sequential contest in which both players have private prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237552

Face-to-Face Lying : An Experimental Study in Sweden and Japan

Holm, Håkan J.; Kawagoe, Toshiji - 2008

This paper investigates face-to-face lying and beliefs associated with it. In experiments in Sweden and Japan, subjects answer questions about personal characteristics, play a face-to-face sender-receiver game and participate in an elicitation of lie-detection beliefs. The previous finding of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220436

Gender, information and the efficiency of household production decisions : an experiment in rural Togo

Apedo-Amah, Marie Christine; Djebbari, Habiba; Ziparo, … - 2020

-in-the-field experiment, male producers allocate too few inputs to their wife's plot, failing to maximize household aggregate profits. They do …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168047

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - 2015 - This Version: February 2015

Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479932

Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanism

Vollstädt, Ulrike; Imcke, Patrick; Brendel, Franziska; … - 2020

Our study proposes a novel mechanism to reduce information asymmetry about product quality between buyers and sellers. Product testing organizations like Consumer Reports (US) and Stiftung Warentest (Germany) seek to reduce this asymmetry by providing credible information. However, limited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012405619

Lying About Delegation

Sutan, Angela - 2015

This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029512