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no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
In this note I give a full characterization of all deterministic direct mechanisms in the public good provision problem with independent private values that are dominant strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and ex-post budget balanced.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337703
Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). Suppose this mechanism has the additional property that the utility from participating in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435962
Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723
This paper analyses the efficiency of the Texas shootout and ½-auction partnership dissolution mechanisms when one of … the partners has a chance to observe the other partner's valuation. The efficiency of the Texas shootout mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012934500
If communication involves some transactions cost to both sender and recipient, what policy ensures that correct messages - those with positive social surplus - get sent? Filters block messages that harm recipients but benefit senders by more than transactions costs. Taxes can block positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195139
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504686
In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However, information about the quality of the match may be incomplete. We consider the case in which each bidder observes the quality of his match with the seller but the seller does not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139399
We study the relationship between two-agent implementation problems and the notionof interim efficiency due to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852742
We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on the latter's abilities, which are private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000