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Signaling in the ‘Before’ Model of Final Offer Arbitration
Farmer, Amy; Pecorino, Paul - 2021
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246967
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Costly Voluntary Disclosure in a Screening Game
Pecorino, Paul - 2013
We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly voluntary disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical prediction is that costly voluntary disclosures will not occur. This hinges on the prediction that the person...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079903
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A Signaling Model of a Lawyer with Private Information About Her Talent
Xiao, Jean - 2011
I examine the incentives and effort choices of lawyers that reflect their anticipation that those perceived as high-talent lawyers will be able to command higher fees in future contracts they are offered by the observers of their effort levels. The analysis employs three versions of a two-type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181829
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On cheating and whistleblowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290
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Persuasive Signalling
Degan, Arianna - 2015
We present a model of persuasive signalling, where a privately-informed sender selects from a class of signals with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038885
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Advertising in online labor markets : a signal of freelancer quality?
Hannane, Jonas - 2024
, advertising can serve as a signal of product quality for experience goods. As such, advertising might help skilled new freelancers … explores the role of advertising in online labor markets using transactional data from a major platform. While indeed newer …. Taken together, my results contrast the hypotheses derived from signaling models of advertising. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014561411
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On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - 2004
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077977
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Mixed signals : investment distortions with adverse selection
Darst, R. Matthew; Refayet, Ehraz - 2019
We study how adverse selection distorts equilibrium investment allocations in a Walrasian credit market with two-sided heterogeneity. Representative investor and partial equilibrium economies are special cases where investment allocations are distorted above perfect information allocations. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181247
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Crowdfunding in a competitive environment
Miglo, Anton - In: Journal of risk and financial management : JRFM 13 (2020) 3/39, pp. 1-38
Crowdfunding has mostly been used to finance very unique projects. Recently, however, companies have begun using it to finance more traditional products where they compete against other sellers of similar products. Major crowdfunding platforms, Kickstarter and Indiegogo, as well as Amazon have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012174171
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Costly Signaling, Pleading, and Settlement
Hubbard, William H. J. - 2017
This paper develops a game-theoretic model that explores the use of costly signals in a litigation environment with private information held by the plaintiff. I compare the costly signaling model with the canonical models of settlement through screening (Bebchuk 1984) and settlement signaling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012959288