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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2014 - Revised version, April 2014
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2016
information on reciprocity types, implementability of an incentive-compatible social choice function is guaranteed if it satises … an additional insurance property. By contrast, precise information on reciprocity types may imply that all ecient social … agents have private information about their material payo types and their reciprocity types. We also provide a systematic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444226
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Mechanim design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - 2012 - This version: August 2012
; Reciprocity ; Revelation Principle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743166
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Bonus pools and the informativeness principle
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
Previous work on moral-hazard problems has shown that, under certain conditions, bonus contracts create optimal individual incentives for risk-neutral workers. In our paper we demonstrate that, if a firm employs at least two workers, it may further bene.t from combining worker compensation via a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198505
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
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Mechanism design and intentions
Bierbrauer, Felix; Netzer, Nick - In: Journal of economic theory 163 (2016), pp. 557-603
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593452
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Pro bono work and trust in expert fields
Ong, David; Yang, Chun-lei - 2014 - This version: July 26, 2014
A controversy has been simmering in law for at least 30 years about whether pro bono work should be mandatory for lawyers, who now donate 1-3% of their time to the poor. This has centered on the unmet legal needs of the poor, the duty of lawyers, and the contrast with US doctors, who are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383298