interdependence because information about each state affects both decisions. Senders are imperfectly informed and communication … one of the states. I show that communication depends on how the interdependence aggregates decision-specific biases. This … aggregation can lead to positive or negative informational spillovers, which affect communication incentives. Secondly, I analyse …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …

informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the … one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation …