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Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies caused by superior information of sellers about the surplus-maximizing quality. While standard theory predicts that equal mark-up prices solve the credence goods problem if customers can verify the quality received, experimental evidence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479932
Costless and non-binding pre-play communication (cheap talk) has been found to often be effective in achieving efficient outcomes in experimental games. However, in previous two-player experimental games each player was informed about both his payoff and the action of the other player in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122582
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003894591
In economic environments, decision-makers can strategically delay irreversible investments to learn from the actions of others. This creates free-riding incentives and can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. We experimentally examine if and how communication mitigates this free-riding problem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014299600
We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some probability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to influence their competitorś product-market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301237
In this paper we present results from experimental asset markets and simulations with traders who receive asymmetric information about the fundamental value of an asset. In the experimental markets with repetition insiders outperform the market and uninformed computerized random traders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009733224
Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195916
We investigate implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information concerning the state from epistemological perspectives. While each agent is either selfish or honest, they do not expect other participants to be honest. Nevertheless, an honest agent may exist, not among the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079528
This paper studies implementation in settings where agents take strategic actions that influence preferences. We show that such settings can arise in entry auctions for markets, and that the Vickery-Clarke-Groves Mechanism is not guaranteed to be truthful because of strategic actions. We thus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106692
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605