We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver. The utility of the sender is a function...

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...

We study a duopoly where the two price setting firms have symmetric information. The firms produce substitute goods with a state dependent common value. The information that is available to both firms about the unknown state of nature is also available to the consumers, who also have access to...

This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding product quality. A revising agent observes a small sample of actions played in the population and also receives a private signal indicating the realized state. Using a simple heuristic, the agent...

We study the robustness of cheap-talk equilibria to infinitesimal private information of the receiver in a model with a binary state-space and state-independent sender-preferences. We show that the sender-optimal equilibrium is robust if and only if this equilibrium either reveals no information...