aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the … effects of consumer information, where consumers suffer from either a minor or serious problem and only experts can infer the … endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of …

between experts and consumers. The functioning of the market heavily relies on trust on the side of the consumer as well as … behavior of experts, however, is not significantly influenced by the health care framing, nor by the subject pool. …

When experts have superior information on their customers' needs and appropriate treatment/repair/advice is a credence … good, there are obvious incentives for opportunistic behavior. What compounds this is that experts regularly make treatment …

Markets for credence goods are classified by experts alone being able to identify consumers' problems and determine … appropriate services for solution. Examining a market where experts have to invest in costly diagnosis to correctly identify … problems and consumers being able to visit multiple experts for diagnosis, we introduce heterogeneously qualified experts. We …