endorsed by good signals and fundamentally changed by bad signals. Experts condition their cheating on a consumer's risk of … suffering from a serious problem if they can observe consumer information. Accordingly, experts and low-risk consumers benefit …Markets for expert services are characterized by information asymmetries between experts and consumers. We analyze the …

. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second … field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the …

. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second … field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the …

We experimentally investigate the role of second opinions in markets where experts like doctors both diagnose and … provide the services. Experts may exploit their informational advantage over customers and overtreat by providing a more …

. In theory, poorly informed consumers can protect themselves from maltreatment through sellers by asking for second … field experiment in the market for computer repairs. We find that revealing a second opinion from another expert to the …

framework. We test the model’s predictions in a laboratory experiment. Both in theory and in the experiment diagnostic … uncertainty decreases the rate of efficient service provision and leads to less trade. In theory, insurance also decreases the … net effect on welfare. In the experiment, the net effect of insurance coverage on efficiency turns out to be positive. We …