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Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420
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On asymmetric reserve prices
Kotowski, Maciej H. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 205-237
compared to an optimal common reserve price. Implications for auction design are considered. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855864
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Asymmetric information in auctions : are resellers better appraisers?
Koptyug, Nikita - 2016
heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430656
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Electricity markets : designing auctions where suppliers have uncertain costs
Holmberg, Pär; Wolak, Frank A. - 2015
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410462
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Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360
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Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2018
We consider a multi-dimensional procurement problem in which sellers have private information about their costs and about a possible design flaw. The information about the design flaw is necessarily correlated. We solve for the optimal Bayesian procurement mechanism that implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976063
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2019
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112503
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Tell the truth or not? : the Montero mechanism for emissions control at work
Requate, Tilman; Camacho-Cuena, Eva; Ch'ng, Kean Siang; … - 2018
We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, grandfathering and pure auctioning. We conducted 27 treatments with a total of 623 participants,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787201
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best … main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also … show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888
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Signaling in first-price auctions
Rieck, Thomas - 2010
learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124829