In this paper the role of information asymmetries between regions and a centralized authority is analyzed. In a model with inter-regional externalities due to capital mobility and a source-based tax instrument, we first derive conditions for which the optimum can be implemented by an adequately...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered...

In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D'Aspremont-Gerard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in...

This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimal taxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the...

Information sharing between governments is examined in an optimal-taxation framework. We introduce a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion found in earlier...