We study trade in dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection. Differently from the literature on the topic so far, we assume that the informed sellers make the offers, so that signaling through prices is possible. We establish basic properties of equilibria, provide necessary and...

We investigate the efficiency of dynamic random matching and bilateral bargaining markets with adverse selection. We take a detail-free approach to the bargaining game, assuming only that: (a) each agent's actions are optimal given the equilibrium market conditions and the equilibrium strategy...

The authors study a dynamic, decentralized lemons market with one-time entry and characterize its set of non-stationary equilibrium. This framework offers a theory of how a market suffering from adverse selection recovers over time endogenously; given an initial fraction of lemons, the model...

In this paper, we study the impact of disclosing information about school quality of private schools in Brazil on school choice. Particularly, we investigate whether test score disclosure affected private schools' tuition prices. In 2006, Brazil started to announce the schools' average test...