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Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

necessities of signalling are shown to generate very strong investment incentives. These incentives are based on the desire not to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; Deneckere, Raymond J. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1897-1945). 2002

bargaining: union contract negotiations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024495

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been studied separately. Players who could secure themselves a large surplus share if bargainers were purely self-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

An empirical analysis of litigation with discovery : the role of fairness

Pecorino, Paul; VanBoening, Mark Virgil - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 81 (2019), pp. 172-184

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242069

Auctioning IT contracts with renegotiable scope

Huang, He; Li, Zhipeng; Liu, De; Xu, Hongyan - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 8, pp. 6003-6023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013371204

When Knowledge Isn't Power : Asymmetric Information, Probabilistic Deceit Detection and Threats in Ultimatum Bargaining

Ferreira, Mark - 2016

We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880

Does ABC Information Exacerbate Hold-Up Problems in Buyer-Supplier Negotiations?

Drake, Andrea; Haka, Susan F. - 2007

Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship … leads negotiators to trade-off potential utility losses due to fairness considerations and potential monetary gains. Fewer … (more) negotiators chose to share fine (coarse) information and thus minimize fairness based utility losses (maximize …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048268

Contracting with endogenously incomplete commitment: escape clauses

Tangerås, Thomas P.; Gick, Wolfgang - 2021

We study mechanism design under endogenously incomplete commitment as it arises in contracting with escape clauses. An escape clause permits the agent to end a contractual relationship under specified circumstances, after which the principal can offer an ex-post contract. Escape clauses are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012520279

Self-serving invocations of shared and asymmetric history in negotiations

Dezsö, Linda; Loewenstein, George F. - 2019 - Last updated on March 29th, 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138433

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