We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which … characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit … offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the …

– supplier selection. We find that the likelihood that a potential supplier (hereafter, a vendor) is selected to be an actual … supplier (hereafter, supplier) increases when personal connections between executives of the vendor and the customer exist. The …

We begin with a supplier (she) who wholesales to a retailer (he), and is considering to encroach into the retail market …). Under the latter encroachment, the retailer may choose to share his private demand information with the supplier, but the … supplier must pay the retailer commission fees proportional to her direct sales revenue. In contrast, under the direct channel …

supplier privileged with private information about supply disruption risk. The supplier's initial reliability, asymmetric to … regime the payoff of either the high- or low-reliability supplier monotonically increases with their initial reliability … monotonically increase. By contrast, in the pull regime, the manufacturer's payoff will always increase, while the supplier's payoff …