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Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - 2021
incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to "cross …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012416248
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Pay transparency under subjective performance evaluation
Fahn, Matthias; Zanarone, Giorgio - 2021
incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to "cross …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418628
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Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission
Cassar, Lea - 2016
I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort by the choice of the project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned, and the agents have unobservable intrinsic motivation levels. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184
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Inputs, incentives, and self-selection at the workplace
Amodio, Francesco; Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A. - 2019
This paper studies how asymmetric information over inputs affects workers' response to incentives and self-selection at … and managers shape the response to incentives and self-selection at the workplace. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012147088
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Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on
MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
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Don't demotivate, discriminate
Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.; Swank, Otto H. - 2014
This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238944
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Veto-based delegation
Mylovanov, Tymofiy - 2005 - First version: October 2004, this version: January 2005
In a principal-agent model with hidden information and no monetary transfers, I establish the Veto-Power Principle: any incentive-compatible outcome can be implemented through veto-based delegation with an endogenously chosen default decision. This result demonstrates the exact nature of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373505
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Disclosure of Status in an Agency Setting
Marino, Anthony M. - 2014
We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013067101
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Determinants and Consequences of Chief Information Officer Equity Incentives
Sanchez, Juan Manuel - 2018
implement appropriate equity compensation incentives (i.e., those resulting from stock and stock options) tying the executive …'s wealth to firm value. To date, research does not address what factors a firm should consider when designing CIO incentives … and how these incentives influence firm performance. To address this major gap, we examine both the antecedents and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917256
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Don't Demotivate, Discriminate
Kamphorst, Jurjen J.A; Swank, Otto H. - 2014
This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014037675