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Preferences or private assessments on a monetary policy committee?
Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael; Rivera, Carlos Velasco - In: Journal of monetary economics 67 (2014), pp. 16-32
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510929
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Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees : an experimental study
Le Quement, Mark T.; Marcin, Isabel - 2016
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011444227
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Sequential aggregation of verifiable information
Hahn, Volker - 2010 - This version: September 2010
We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008748176
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Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees : an experimental study
Thordal-Le Quement, Mark; Marcin, Isabel - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 174 (2020), pp. 449-468
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012288403
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Committees of experts in the lab
Renes, Sander; Visser, Bauke - 2018
Theory predicts that committees of experts may take decisions that look good but are bad and that they show a united … front to impress evaluators. Although evaluators see through this behavior, committees persist in it only to avoid worse … of committees, words speak louder than costly decisions. Evaluators pick this up. Orthogonality tests show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895939
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The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a new Keynesian model with private information
Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard J.; Fujiwara, Ippei - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517235
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The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information
Waki, Yuichiro; Dennis, Richard J.; Fujiwara, Ippei - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1319-1368
This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937351
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? : some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the precision of public information or withholding it. The latter seems to be unrealistic. Thus, the issue is not whether central bank should disclose or not its information, but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
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Private news and monetary policy : forward guidance as Bayesian persuasion
Fujiwara, Ippei; Waki, Yuichiro - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012224691
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Optimal taxes under private information : the role of inflation
Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro; Waller, Christopher - In: Journal of money, credit and banking : JMCB 54 (2022) 7, pp. 1941-1969
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013466579