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Pollrich, Martin - 2015

offering a menu of contracts. The analysis provides a proper benchmark for studying auditing under limited commitment and sheds … new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting and on the design of optimal mechanisms. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322

Mediated audits

Pollrich, Martin - In: The Rand journal of economics 48 (2017) 1, pp. 44-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665486

Contracting for Multiple Goods Under Asymmetric Information

Hori, Kazumi - 2013

Optimal contracts between a buyer and a seller who trade multiple goods under asymmetric information are considered. The seller makes sequences of unobservable investments, and then realizes the value of the goods. The investment level and value of goods are private information for the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083648

Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance

Luz, Vitor Farinha - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1349-1391

This paper provides a complete characterization of equilibria in a game-theoretic version of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists. Exact conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744297

Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment

Hori, Kazumi - 2013

A bilateral trading model with investment is considered. In a "cooperative" investment version of the model, the seller's investment stochastically determines the buyer's valuation of the good. The value and cost of the good are realized only after the investment is made, and the investment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195127

Chapter 10. Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets

Golosov, M.; Tsyvinski, A.; Werquin, N. - In: Handbook of macroeconomics : volume 2, v. 2A-2B SET, (pp. 725-841). 2016

In this chapter we study dynamic incentive models in which risk sharing is endogenously limited by the presence of informational or enforcement frictions. We comprehensively overview one of the most important tools for the analysis such problems—the theory of recursive contracts. Recursive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024287

Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment

Deb, Rahul; Said, Maher - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013

We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897046

Signaling versus auditing

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2021

), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers’ productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We … characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial … feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774

Signaling versus costly information acquisition

Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei - 2018

' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619

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