We construct a novel database containing the universe of financial advisers in the United States from 2005 to 2015, representing approximately 10% of employment of the finance and insurance sector. We provide the first large-scale study that documents the economy-wide extent of misconduct among...

Firms sometimes know more about a consumer's expected usage than the consumer herself. We explore the consequences of this reversal in the information asymmetry. We analyze the consequences of making consumers more informed about themselves. While making consumers more informed decreases their...

We exploit a natural experiment in the largest online consumer lending platform to provide the first evidence that loan terms, in particular maturity choice, can be used to screen borrowers based on their private information. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers who took...

We exploit a natural experiment in the largest online consumer lending platform to provide the first evidence that loan terms, in particular maturity choice, can be used to screen borrowers based on their private information. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers who took...

I study the effect of interest rates on banks' lending standards. I find that low (high) interest rates discourage (encourage) screening but facilitate (hinder) effort provision. Less screening, as a result of low interest rates, increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. I further show that...

I study the effect of interest rates on banks' lending standards and find that low (high) interest rates discourage (encourage) screening but facilitate (hinder) effort provision. Less screening as a result of low interest rates increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. I further show that...

We examine whether more sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual accounting) interact with other information sources to reduce information asymmetries between small business borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers' probability of loan denial and cost of debt. We find...

We empirically study how the underlying riskiness of the pool of home equity line of credit originations is affected over the credit cycle. Drawing from the largest existing database of U.S. home equity lines of credit, we use county-level aggregates of these loans to estimate panel regressions...

We ask whether the correlation between mortgage leverage and default is due to moral hazard (the causal effect of leverage) or adverse selection (ex-ante risky borrowers choosing larger loans). We separate these information asymmetries using a natural experiment resulting from (i) the unique...