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This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, I derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or I show that it does not exist. Each participant's utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115638
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317636
which students signal their abilities with costly observable signals. A closed-form symmetric separating equilibrium of this … equilibrium, an increase in the number of students, a reduction in the number of school seats or a drop in the quality of schools …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000
There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708
Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048268
We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953021
We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901595
the majority": there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus … enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium … inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. This equilibrium displays a tyranny of the minority": it …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603226
In this article I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may manipulate voting coalitions to their advantage by crafting different messages to target different winning coalitions. Furthermore, if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147869
implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use only detail-free mechanisms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079528