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Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information

Allen, Beth Elaine - 2008

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770273

After the Storm : Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Examination of the 'Minnesota Model' for National Regulation of Mortgage Brokers and Tomorrow's Predatory Lenders

Ireland, Mark - 2012

There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708

Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications

Yenmez, M. Bumin - 2012

This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, I derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or I show that it does not exist. Each participant's utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115638

Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity

Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - 2005

, then delegating to wage-maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067341

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies With and Without Indivisibilities

Forges, Françoise - 2021

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a socially designed characteristic function, which expresses the fact that coalitions allocate goods by means of random incentive compatible mechanisms. We first survey some results in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317636

Does ABC Information Exacerbate Hold-Up Problems in Buyer-Supplier Negotiations?

Drake, Andrea; Haka, Susan F. - 2007

Negotiations between buyers and suppliers that require sharing cost details to identify profitable relationship specific investments often fail and result in hold-ups. Based on inequity aversion, strategic uncertainty, and risk dominance criteria, we expect negotiators to be more reluctant to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048268

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

Eliaz, Kfir; Ray, Debraj; Razin, Ronny - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002343551

Honesty and Epistemological Implementation with Asymmetric Information

Matsushima, Hitoshi - 2022

implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We use only detail-free mechanisms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079528

Group Decision-Making in the Shadow of Disagreement

Ray, Debraj; Eliaz, Kfir; Razin, Ronny - 2004

of the majority": there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative … equilibrium inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. This equilibrium displays a "tyranny of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029222

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement

Eliaz, Kfir; Ray, Debraj; Razin, Ronny - 2004

the majority": there is always an equilibrium in which the majority is more aggressive in pushing its alternative, thus … enforcing their will via both numbers and voice. However, under very general conditions an aggressive minority equilibrium … inevitably makes an appearance, provided that the group is large enough. This equilibrium displays a tyranny of the minority": it …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603226