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Mass, Helene - 2018

rationality and eliminate all strategies which are not rationalizable. Second, I apply the maximin expected utility criterion …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946016

The design of ambiguous mechanisms

Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015

We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549

Learning in Contests with Payoff Risk and Foregone Payoff Information

Masiliūnas, Aidas - 2019

second source of noise is present because of payoff risk, which reduces the correlation between expected and realized payoffs …. We manipulate payoff risk using a 2x2 design: payoffs from contest investments are either risky (as in standard contests … safe (as in standard contests) or risky. We find that Nash equilibrium rates go up to 100% when payoff risk is not present …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869714

Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases

Karakoç, Gülen - 2020

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014093182

Communication with forgetful liars

Jehiel, Philippe - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 605-638

I consider multi-round cheap talk communication environments in which, after a lie, the informed party has no memory of the content of the lie. I characterize the equilibria with forgetful liars in such settings assuming that a liar's expectation about his past lie coincides with the equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587426

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2019 - This version: June 17, 2019

We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive- form games with unawareness … that we call prudent rationalizability. It is an extensive-form analogue of iterated admissibility. In each round of the … set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101418

Eliciting private information with noise : the case of randomized response

Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - 2013

The paper formalizes Warner's (1965) randomized response technique (RRT) as a game and implements it experimentally, thus linking game theoretic approaches to randomness in communication with survey practice in the field and a novel implementation in the lab. As predicted by our model and in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010201201

Optimal Allocation of Multi-Dimensional Prizes in Contests with Heterogeneous Agents

Antsygina, Anastasia - 2021

We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212096