Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

A decision-maker solicits information from two partially informed experts and then makes a choice under uncertainty. The experts can be either moderately or extremely biased relative to the decision-maker, which is their private information. I investigate the incentives of the experts to share...

A principal acquires information about a shock and then discloses it to an agent. After the disclosure, the principal and agent each decide whether to take costly preparatory actions that yield benefits only when the shock strikes. The principal maximizes his expected payoff by controlling the...

In the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player's bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation

This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...