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Screening in courts : on the joint use of negligence and causation standards

Feess, Eberhard; Mühlheußer, Gerd; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 27 (2011) 2, pp. 350-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261834

Die Haftung gesicherter Kreditgeber für Umweltschäden aus ökonomischer Sicht

Feess, Eberhard - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000622941

Heterogeneity and optimal self-reporting

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 162 (2006) 2, pp. 277-290

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003355990

Evidence dependence of fine reductions in corporate leniency programs

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 166 (2010) 4, pp. 573-590

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008859895

Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents

Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960

Implementing efficient market structures : the role of information transmission

Feess, Eberhard; Paust, Michael - In: FinanzArchiv : European journal of public finance 71 (2015) 2, pp. 240-277

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446947

Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents

Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942

An analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002485585

Optimal self-reporting schemes with multiple stages and option values

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: International tax and public finance 12 (2005) 3, pp. 265-279

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002889962

When should prinipals asquire verifiable information?

Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002721593