We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states...

We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric...

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation...

This paper compares the link between exchange rates and interest rates under full information and two alternative asymmetric information approaches. It also distinguishes between cases of expansionary and contractionary depreciations. Full information results are not robust to the presence of...

Does the effect of monetary policy depend on the macroeconomic information released by the central bank? Because differences between central bank's and private agents' information sets affect private agents' interpretation of policy decisions, this paper aims to investigate whether the...

This paper highlights the implications for EU macroeconomic policy at a relatively disaggregated level when key economic relationships are nonlinear or asymmetric. Using data for the EU and OECD countries we show that there are considerable non-linearities and asymmetries in the Phillips and...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...