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provide higher quality services to all consumers. The externality renders the market outcome inefficient. Price regulation …, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory … provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
Regulators and the firms they regulate interact repeatedly. Over the course of these interactions, the regulator collects data that contains information about the firm's id- iosyncratic private characteristics. This paper studies the case in which the regulator uses information gleaned from past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024566
all, in a sense to be made precise. -- Asymmetric Information ; Learning by Doing ; Regulation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003892452
We build a principal-agent-client model of corruption, allowing for heterogeneity in the value of public projects …, and thereby facilitate their corruption, by means of public displays of wealth. While such public displays reduce the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014167757
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305
I study the optimal audit mechanism when the principal cannot commit to an audit strategy. Invoking a relevation principle, the agent reports her type to a mediator whi assigns contracts and recommends the principla whether to audit. For each reported type the mediator randomizes over a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996
We introduce uncertainty into Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to study optimal long-term contracting with learning. In a dynamic relationship, the agent's shirking not only reduces current performance but also increases the agent’s information rent due to the persistent belief manipulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011557712
A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent's output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061227
This paper considers an environment where two principals sequentially contract with a common agent and studies the exchange of information between the two bilateral relationships. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the decisions taken by the downstream...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003779206