We provide a technique for constructing optimal multiattribute screening contracts in a general setting with one-dimensional types based on necessary optimality conditions. Our approach allows for type-dependent participation constraints and arbitrary risk profiles. As an example we discuss...

This paper investigates robust information transmission between a sender and a receiver in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model. We characterize behavior that remains equilibrium behavior independently of the form of a small communication cost. Under standard conditions, we find that an...

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a strategic type or a commitment type that plays the same action in every period. The modeling innovation is that the...

This paper studies robust Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in which the sender only has limited knowledge about the receiver's private information. The sender is ambiguity averse and has a maxmin expected utility function. We show that when the sender faces full ambiguity,...

Consider an investment problem with strategic complementarities and incomplete information about returns. This paper shows that investors aggregate their private information in equilibrium by trading a token and observing its market price over multiple rounds before making the investment...

We study contracting when both principal and agent have to exert noncontractible effort for production to take place. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees to each party in spite of the surrounding uncertainty....