I estimate a simultaneous discrete game with incomplete information where players' private information are only required to be median independent of observed states and can be correlated with observable states. This median restriction is weaker than other assumptions on players' private...

We address empirically the issues of the optimality of simple linear compensation contracts and the importance of asymmetries between firms and workers. For that purpose, we consider contracts between the French National Institute of Statistics and Economics (Insee) and the interviewers it hired...

This paper develops and tests a new model of asymmetric information in the labour market involving employer learning. In the model, I provide theoretical conditions for the identification - based on the experience and tenure profiles of estimated returns to ability and education - of employer...

This paper studies the welfare impact of reputation/feedback systems in markets where both adverse selection and moral hazard are present. Using a transaction-level dataset from an online credit market, I estimate a dynamic model of borrowers and lenders, in which borrowers are subject to...

We propose an empirical framework for a Cournot-oligopoly model where firms have private information about their own marginal costs. Considering a linear demand with random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot-Nash equilibrium and determine testable implications from the joint...

Since Chiappori and Salani e (2000), testing for asymmetric information has become tantamount to testing for a positive relation between risk and coverage which is predicted by (equilibrium) models for adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper we analyze asymmetric information in...

Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In...