We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and...

I analyze a manager's decision to disclose private information when the stock market is a source of information for corporate investment-making. A manager with long-term incentives discloses her private information only if it crowds-in informed trading and increases the manager's ability to...

This study examines how national culture affects corporate investment. We argue that national culture affects corporate investment efficiency through the level of secrecy that national culture exhibits. Using a sample of firms from eight culturally-diverse European Union countries, we find that...

This paper examines the relation between information differences across investors (i.e., information asymmetry) and the cost of capital, and establishes that with perfect competition information asymmetry makes no difference. Instead, a firm's cost of capital is governed solely by the average...

We investigate the association between voluntary disclosure and the risk-related discount investors apply to price. First, we study the association between (endogenous) disclosure choice and the discount in price induced by changes in the underlying model parameters: this is akin to an empirical...

I document the variation in measurement of financial covenants, focusing on three measurement rules: earnings (EBITDA vs. EBIT), firm value (including or excluding intangible assets) and inclusion of escalator clauses (provisions that increase the threshold of net worth covenants). I find that...

We ask whether the quality of internal information matters for investment decisions. We predict that investment is more sensitive to internal profit signals and less sensitive to external price signals when managers have higher quality internal information. Consistent with recent theoretical and...

The accuracy of firm information disclosures and the efficiency of long-term investment both play crucial roles in the economy and capital markets. We estimate a dynamic model that captures a trade-off between these two goals that arises when managers confront realistic incentives to misreport...

This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor...

Using the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, we examine the credibility of mandatory disclosure by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on managerial learning from stock prices. We find an increase in investment-price sensitivity for firms affected by the Act. Consistent with managers relying...