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, the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237248
I develop a framework of the buildup and outbreak of financial crises in an asymmetric information setting. In equilibrium, two distinct economic states arise endogenously: "normal times", periods of modest investment, and "booms", periods of expansionary investment. Normal times occur when the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011880642
The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440454
Most firms issue financial assets such as debt or equity (e.g. bonds or stock) to outside investors. While these financial assets differ greatly in their characteristics, their diversity has received little attention in the literature. Filling this important gap in the literature, this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857527
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Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to financing only ethical projects, which have social profitability but lower expected revenues than standard projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers. The matching between SR borrowers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000438
Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to financing only ethical projects, which have social profitability but lower expected revenues than standard projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers. The matching between SR borrowers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705659
Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334832
We develop a dynamic model of debt contracts with adverse selection and belief updates. In the model, entrepreneurs borrow investment goods from lenders to run businesses whose returns depend on entrepreneurial productivity and common productivity. Entrepreneurial productivity is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840518