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affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than …We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career … concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010516456
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We show theoretical and experimental results that demonstrate the potential of transparency to influence committee … decision making and deliberation. We present a model in which committee members have career concerns and unanimity is needed to … treatments. We observe strong effects of transparency on committee error rates that are largely consistent with the model. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486059
We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. If the first period proposal fails, the game ends immediately with an exogenously given "breakdown" probability....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635305
rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665138
rule voting determines the outcome. When the private information pertains to the ideological intensities but the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008669935
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003393846
present a voting model with asymmetric information to illustrate that these formal-legal reforms provide a credible signal of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734538
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012803716
We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state a and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929373