Abstract An implicit assumption in most of the matching literature is that all participants know their preferences. If there is variance in the effort agents spend researching options, some may know more about their preferences, while others may know less. When this is true, strategizing is...

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

This paper studies school choice and information in the context of education markets in rural Haiti. Using a market level randomized control trial, we evaluate the aggregate effect of providing test score information on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment. After the intervention, we...

The attractive properties of the Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm rest on the assumption of perfect information. Yet field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model costly strategic learning when schools are ex ante...