I construct a model of money and credit where financial intermediaries write deposit contracts with economic agents to intermediate credit transactions. A preference shock is private information to a depositor, which is costly for intermediaries to observe. Financial intermediaries create...

This Article argues that information gaps—pockets of information that are pertinent and knowable but not currently known—are a byproduct of shadow banking and a meaningful source of systemic risk. It lays the foundation for this claim by juxtaposing the regulatory regime governing the shadow...

I study the effect of interest rates on banks' lending standards. I find that low (high) interest rates discourage (encourage) screening but facilitate (hinder) effort provision. Less screening, as a result of low interest rates, increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. I further show that...

I study the effect of interest rates on banks' lending standards and find that low (high) interest rates discourage (encourage) screening but facilitate (hinder) effort provision. Less screening as a result of low interest rates increases the likelihood of a banking crisis. I further show that...

This paper studies peer-to-peer (p2p) lending on the Internet. Prosper.com, the first p2p lending website in the US, matches individual lenders and borrowers for unsecured consumer loans. Using transaction data from June 1, 2006 to July 31, 2008, we examine what information problems exist on...

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...

In the early models of incomplete contract neither party used to invest in the subject matter of the contract; those models primarily kept their focus on analyzing the effect of legal rules on parties' incentives to trade or to breach. The modern models stretched beyond that to include value...

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

This paper develops a simple competitive search model to study illiquidity and partial retention of assets as signals of asset quality in markets with private information. I find that both signals are used in equilibrium. However, for sellers with high-quality assets, illiquidity is preferred...