The acquisition of information prior to sale gives rise to a hold-up situation quite naturally. Yet, while the bulk of the literature on the hold-up problem considers negotiations under symmetric information where cooperative short-cuts such as split the difference capture the outcome of...

We consider an adverse selection model in which the agent can gather private information before the principal offers the contract. There are two scenarios. In scenario I, information gathering is a hidden action, while in scenario II, the principal observes the agent's information gathering...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail (HSR) as an exogenous shock to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to (i) a significant increase in information production, evidenced by a higher frequency of analysts visiting portfolio firms,...

Using the introduction of high-speed rail as exogenous shocks to costs of information acquisition, we show that reductions in information-acquisition costs lead to a significant increase in information production and improvement in output quality, evidenced by higher frequency of analysts...