We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

We study economies of asymmetric information with observable types. Trade takes place in lotteries. Individuals face a standard budget constraint, while the incentive compatibility constraints are imposed on the production set of the intermediaries. This formalization encompasses Moral Hazard,...

Bank runs may serve to communicate information across agents, and thus enhance rather than thwart allocation efficiency by making the fundamentals determine the asset prices. Figuratively speaking, banks die (go bankrupt) singing a swan song (revealing hidden information). In this way bank runs...

This paper studies the design of mechanisms that are robust to misspecification. We introduce a novel notion of robustness that connects a variety of disparate approaches and study its implications in a wide class of mechanism design problems. This notion is quantifiable, allowing us to...

The home equity bias is one of the many puzzles existing in international finance. This puzzle is characterized by the concentration of domestic equity in any investor's portfolio, which is in contradiction with the benchmark of full diversification in a world mutual fund. Based on Admati's...

We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and liquidity. Exchange occurs in decentralized markets with frictions making a medium of exchange essential. Some assets are better suited for this role because they are more liquid - more likely to be accepted in...

This Article argues that information gaps—pockets of information that are pertinent and knowable but not currently known—are a byproduct of shadow banking and a meaningful source of systemic risk. It lays the foundation for this claim by juxtaposing the regulatory regime governing the shadow...

Households typically know their nominal wages precisely, but only have a vague idea about he price of the goods and services they consume. Conditional on their nominal wage, this means that inflation is bad news and deflation is good news. If households face Knightian uncertainty about the price...

The author studies the terms of credit in a competitive market in which sellers (lenders) are willing to repeatedly finance the purchases of buyers (borrowers) by engaging in a credit relationship. The key frictions are: (i) the lender is unable to observe the borrower's ability to repay a loan;...