We employ a quasi-natural experiment to examine the effect of investor inattention on firms' voluntary disclosure. While prior research focuses on when managers make mandatory disclosures within a given quarter, we examine whether investor inattention influences what managers voluntarily...

We examine whether managers convey more information via voluntary disclosure channels when standard-setters limit managers' discretion in GAAP. We estimate the extent to which standard setters limit managers' discretion by counting the number of times obligatory modal verbs are mentioned in the...

I study the impact of informed trading on voluntary corporate disclosure in the presence of two frictions: cost of disclosure and value of manager's informedness. In the absence of both frictions, informed trading has no impact on disclosure even when traders are not certain whether the manager...

The literature on voluntary disclosure in oligopolies concentrates either on Cournot markets where firms compete in quantities or on Bertrand markets where firms compete in prices. In this paper we study voluntary disclosure of managerial contract information in a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly where...

We study firms' voluntary disclosures in a world of potential information leaks. We find that managers adapt their disclosure strategy to the likelihood and expected scope of leaks. An increasing likelihood fosters voluntary disclosure if leaks merely expose the manager's information endowment...

We develop a unified treatment of a broad class of truthful disclosure games. Such games have, at most, one equilibrium that is reasonable given a commonly used signaling refinement. We provide a simple algorithm to construct the unique equilibrium strategy and beliefs, and identify necessary...

This paper studies how information disclosure affects investment efficiency and investor welfare in a dynamic setting in which a firm makes sequential investments to adjust its capital stock over time. We show that the effects of accounting disclosures on investment efficiency and investor...

This paper examines the relation between information's properties, such as reliability and relevance, and public disclosure policy. It shows that the optimal accounting system often involves a carefully balanced combination of mandatory and voluntary disclosure, with mandatory reporting focused...

We investigate the association between voluntary disclosure and the risk-related discount investors apply to price. First, we study the association between (endogenous) disclosure choice and the discount in price induced by changes in the underlying model parameters: this is akin to an empirical...