Similar Search Results

Auctions vs. negotiations : the case of favoritism ; conference paper

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2013

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342227

Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? : experimental evidence from Tanzania

Di Falco, Salvatore; Magdalou, Brice; Masclet, David; … - 2016

Embezzlement is a major concern in various settings. By means of a sequential modified dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement and improve the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011475085

Inefficiency in private value bargaining with naive players : an experimental study

Possajennikov, Alexandre; Saran, Rene - 2018

The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503

Majoritarian Contests with Asymmetric Battlefields : An Experiment

Montero, Maria; Possajennikov, Alex; Sefton, Martin; … - 2013

choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014150669

Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine - 2023

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420

Can Transparency of Information Reduce Embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Di Falco, Salvatore - 2016

Embezzlement is a major concern. By means of a sequential dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement. Consistent with reference-dependent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992025