Litigation seems to be a Pareto-ineffcient outcome of pretrial bargaining; however, this paper shows that litigation can be the outcome of rational behavior by a litigant and her attorney. If the attorney has more information than his client concerning the characteristics of the lawsuit, the...

This paper attempts to add greater insight into the study of political influence. It analyzes contracts for lobbying by first placing them into their proper political economy context as well as analyzing them in a modified information transmission mechanism. The main contributions include a more...

Human decision-makers frequently override the recommendations generated by predictive algorithms, but it is unclear whether these discretionary overrides add valuable private information or reintroduce human biases and mistakes. We develop new quasi-experimental tools to measure the impact of...

We provide a general characterization of the structure of rational expectations equilibria of any degree of revelation for pure exchange, sequential economies, with deffinitely many states of private information, an incomplete financial market and nominal assets. We estimate the dimension of the...