Adverse selection harms workers, but benefits firms able to identify talent. An informed intermediary expropriates its agents' ability by threatening to fire and expose them to undervaluation of their skill. Agents' track record gradually reduces the intermediary's information advantage. We show...

Motivated by some real world phenomena, we extend the standard model of decision making with a possibly biased decision maker under career concerns by adding: 1) a consultation stage in which the advice from an advisor is available; 2) the possibility that the decision maker can control the...

An essential ingredient in models of career concerns is ex ante uncertainty about an agent's type. This paper shows how career concerns can arise even in the absence of any such ex ante uncertainty, if the unobservable actions that an agent takes influence his future productivity. By...

Individuals have two possible channels through which to obtain a managerial position: external and internal promotions. Employing the revised German Employment Register, we compare external and internal promotions by using multinomial logit regressions while accounting for workplace...

How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cashflows. Equilibrium financing is driven by...