In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

In this paper we analyze a legislative bargaining game in which parties privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When the private...

We challenge the prevailing view that pure informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion or withholding) leads to better informed policymaking. In the absence of lobbying, the policymaker may prioritize the more-important or ex ante morepromising...

We study disclosure of information about the multidimensional state of the world when uninformed receivers' actions affect the sender's utility. Given a disclosure rule, the receivers form an expectation about the state following each message. Under the assumption that the sender's expected...

We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees...

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game in which legislators privately informed about their preferences bargain over an ideological and a distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. When ideological...

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited...

This paper compares centralized and decentralized policymaking in a game theoretic model of informational lobbying and political contributions. In the model, an interest group first produces verifiable evidence about the welfare effects of its preferred policy and then engages in monetary...

We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an expert with informational superiority to decision makers who vote on a proposal. We show that an expert's simple cheap talk strategy can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their...

We study the optimal disclosure policy of a firm that wishes to maximize its expected stock price in the classic setting in which its stock is traded by risk-averse investors and noise traders. We find that the optimal disclosure policy is imprecise and leads to skewed posterior beliefs. This...