We investigate the role of economic transparency within the framework of one of Townsend's models of "forecasting the forecasts of others". The equilibrium has the property that "higher order beliefs"; are coordinated into a finite-dimensional setup that is amenable to address monetary policy...

We show how macroeconomic dynamics can be derived from asymmetric information. As an illustration of the utility of this approach we derive the equilibrium density, non-equilibrium densities and the equation of motion for the response to a demand shock for productivity in a simple economy. Novel...

I add a moral hazard problem between banks and depositors as in Gertler and Karadi (2009) to a DSGE model with a costly state verification problem between entrepreneurs and banks as in Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG). This modification amplifies the response of the external finance premium and the...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation...