We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the … then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general … "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information …

This paper considers a population of agents that are engaged in a listening network. The agents wish to match their … neighbors in the network. I derive a closed expression for the (interim) social welfare loss that depends on the initial … information structure and on the possible pieces of information that can be gathered under the network. Then, I explore how …

This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The … experimental design extends the basic Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by … network has a "star" structure. We find that with homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast …

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The … experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing … private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents …

, incomplete and irregular network can be stable, with firms observing high variance signals acting as "critical nodes". Finally …, when signals are correlated, the empty network may not be pairwise stable when the number of firms and/or correlation are …

This paper studies information acquisition and use in network games. The network structure incorporates both strategic … complements (positive links) and substitutes (negative links). An information-use game played on a correlation-adjusted network is …

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the … then we study how the network design and the utility specifications affect welfare. Surprisingly, we find that in general … "babblers" or "friends", irrespective of whether the network is unilateral or bilateral, in equilibrium, targeted information …

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately … their neighbors in the network. We first characterize myopic (best response) equilibria as well as fully informative myopic … dominate farsighted equilibria, in particular if a social planner has designed the network optimally. …

in a social network. They communicate strategically to influence the others' beliefs in their favor: the sender sends a …